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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
in the performance of a purely ministerial duty,2 4 and to a writ of injunc-
tion where his action was not authorized by the statutes under which he
assumed to act.2
5
In the instant case, the court did not mention the First Assistant Post-
master General's exclusive authority to order changes in the number of daily
mail deliveries. No authority was cited by the court, nor has any been
found, for the proposition that continued receipt of mail at fixed intervals
is such a substantial right as will justify the court in interfering with the
discretionary authority of the Postmaster General and local postmasters.
While analogous cases have bccn decided on the basis of the defendant's
exceeding his statutory authority, such was not the situation here. Prior to
the instant case, no court had undertaken to enjoin a postmaster from carry-
ing out the orders of his superior, onl thc grounds of discriminatoin. While
a local postmaster may not be afforded so wide a latitude in exercising dis-
cretionary authority as the Postiastcr General, the court, in deciding the
instant case, would appear to have acted without substantial authority.
SALES-EXECUTED CONTRACTS-SALE OF FRUIT ON TREES
Plaintiff, cirtus grower, contracted with defendants, fruit packers, for
the sale of unpicked grapefruit, the probable barvesting date being set more
than two months from the date of contract. Defendants ring-picked the
orchard five times and then refused to clean the trees, as provided in the
contract, charging that the fruit had not developed suitably for their pur-
poses due to the plaintiff's breach of an implicd obligation to care for and
water the orchard. Plaintiff sought to recover the difference between the
contract price and that obtained by a sale of the remaining fruit. The trial
court entered an instructed verdict for the plaintiff which was reversed and
remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals' on the grounds of error in refusing
to let the defense of implied obligations go to the jury. Held, affirming
the instructed verdict for the plaintiff, the contract was one of sale and
passed immediate title to the defendants, thus relieving the plaintiff from
further duty. Moffitt v. Hieby, 229 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. 1950).
A contract is executed when nothing remains to be done by either
party.2 In the case of a contract for the sale of personal property the ques-
tion of execution is one of fact," the answer to which is dependent upon
24. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838).
25. American School of Magnetic Healing v. NMcAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
1. Moffit v. Ilieby, 225 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
2. Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124 (1879); Farrington v. Tennessee, 95
U.S. 679 (1877); E. C. Artman Lumber Co. v. Bogard, 191 Ky. 392, 230 S.W. 953
(1921).
3. N. P. Sloan Co. v. Barhain, 138 Ark. 350, 211 S.W. 381 (1919); First National
Bank of Ottumwa v. Reno, 73 Iowa 145, 34 N.W. 796 (1887); Johnson v. Tabor, 101
Miss. 78, 57 So. 365 (1912); Sanford v. Nickerson, 91 N.I. 71, 13 A.2d 723 (1940).
CASES NOTED
the intentions of the parties, however manifested.4  Such intention should
not be determined from the writing alone" but from an examination of the
conduct of the partics6 and the circumstances surrounding the making of
the agreement.7 Although the inquiry is determined by the court in cases
in which the facts are not disputed8 or where the facts indicate a justification
of but one conclusion,, the question remains one of fact. Where there is
any doubt as to the intentions, the question is appropriate for the jury."
To aid in the settlement of controversies such as that presented in the
instanit case, the law has developed rules which are held to be the presumed
intentions of the parties until rcbutted by evidence to the contrary.'' One
of these presumptions is that title does not pass if the seller has yet to expend
labor upon the goods in order to put them in the condition contemplated
by the contract.1 2 This condition occurs when the goods are in a deliverable
state, which is held to be that state in which the purchaser would be bound
to accept delivery. 3 The facts in the instant case would raise the question
of whether the goods were in the condition contemplated by the contract
while they were still undeveloped, as they were when the contract was made,
or after they had matured to the point of bcing marketable. By holding,
without apparent reason, that the contract was executed, the court has
conveniently by-passed any question of intention or presumed intention of
the parties.
While it does not so state, the principal case may be said to stand for
the proposition that a written contract for the sale of personal property is
executed when made unless the conditions precedent to its execution are
4. Barde Steel Products Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 40 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1930);
Ilyatt v. Reynolds, 245 Ala. 411, 17 So.2d 413 (1944); Wilson Motor o. v. Lamping
Motors Inc., 194 Wash. 416, 78 P.2d 559 (1938).
5. The use of words such as 'buy", "bought", "sell" or "sold" in the contract are
not always controlling since they are commonly held to express an intention "to buy" or
"to sell." Meibus & Drescher Co. v. Mills, 150 Cal. 229, 88 Pac. 917 (1907); Frazier
v. Simmons, 139 Mass. 531, 2 N.E. 112 (1885); Cassinelli v. Ilumphery Supply Co., 43
Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 534 (1919).
6. Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. v. Roseman, 134 Iowa 597, 13 N.W.2d 347 (1944);
Meyer v. W. R. Grace & Co., 290 785 (7th Cir. 1923).
7. Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 2; Heybrook v. Beard, 75 Wash. 646, 135
Pac. 626 (1913); see Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 233 N.Y. 97, 134
N.E. 849, 850 (1922).
8. McKinney v. Sargent, 216 Cal. 18, 13 Pac. 373 (1932); Peterson v. Universal
Automobile Ins. Co., 53 Idaho 11, 20 P.2d 1016 (1933).
9. Brown v. Herrick, 34 Idaho 171, 200 Pac. 177 (1921); Kcr v. Henderson, 62
N.J.L. 724, 42 Atl. 1073 (1899); Buskirk Bros. v. Peck, 57 W.Va. 360, 50 S.E. 432
(1905).
10. Wheelock v. Starkweather, 146 Mich. 53, 108 N.W. 1085 (1906); Owens v.
Daniel, 16 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Morris v. Knepper, 10 S.W.2d 1012
(Tcx. Civ. App. 1928).
]I. See WILrsON, SALES § 263 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
12. The Elgec Cotton Cases, 22 Wall. 180 (U.S. 1874); Trip v. Wade, 82 Fla. 325,
89 So. 870 (1921); Portland Seed Co. v. Clark, 35 Idaho 44, 204 Pac. 146 (1922);
Restad v. Engeinocn, 65 Minn. 148, 67 N.,. 1146 (1896).
13. This is in accordance with the common law as codified by the UNctORN! SALES
ACT § 76(4), and the English SALE OF Goons ACT § 63(4).
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stipulated in the writing. To follow this doctrine would lead to results even
more inequitable than that reached in the instant case.
By so holding, the court circumvented any question of the defendants'
contention that the plaintiff breached an implied obligation to care for the
fruit while it developed into a deliverable state. If this obligation did in
fact exist, it would operate as a condition precedent to the execution of the
contract,"4 thereby relieving the defendants from further performance.'5
When the written contract is wanting in the full understanding between the
parties, their conduct and the nature of the transaction may, and often must,
be referred to in order to complete the picture of intended obligations.' 6
While there is no presumption that a contract will impose impossible or
absurd conditions, 7 still the court has the duty to adopt and enforce such
implied conditions as are clearly within the sphere of that which the parties
did not intend to disregard as going toward the fulfillment of the purpose
of the contract.' 8
TORTS - RIGHT OF MINOR TO SUE PARENT
Action was brought by an administrator of a deceased unemancipated
minor child against his father's administrator under the Wrongful Death
Statute' to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident because
of the father's wilful misconduct in driving while intoxicated. Held, that
an unemancipated minor child may maintain an action for damages against
his parent for a wilful or malicious personal tort. Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d
445 (Ore. 1950).
In the United States prior to 1891, the right of a minor to sue his parent
in tort was frowned upon, "unless to redress clear and palpable injustice".2
This right was directly in issue for the first time in the United States in
1891.8 Recovery was not allowed.' In the absence of statute," the majority
14. See note 2 supra.
15. Bunch v. Weil Bros. & Bauer, 72 Ark. 343, 80 S.W. 582 (1904); Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. v. Walker, 76 Kan. 903, 92 Pac. 1129 (1907); Noble v. Higgins, 214 App.
Div. 135, 211 N.Y. Supp. 833 (1925).
16. Rifkin v. Safenovitz, 131 Conn. 411, 40 A.2d 188 (1944); see Rockwell v.
New Departure Mfg. Co., 102 Conn. 255, 286, 128 Ati. 302, 312 (1925).
17. Stough v. Healy, 75 Kan. 526, 89 Pac. 898 (1907); Pistel v. Imperial Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 88 Md. 552, 42 At]. 210 (1898); Blake v. H-amburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co.,
67 Tex. 160, 2 S.W. 368 (1886); Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 31
Wyo. 314, 226 Pac. 193 (1924).
18. Cox. v. Chase, 95 Kan. 531, 148 Pac. 766 (1915); J. B. Wallis & Co. v. Val-
lace, 92 S.W. 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W.Va.
433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
1. ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. § 8-903 (1940):
2. Bird v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189, 196, 23 La. Rep. 162, 168, 169 (1850); see
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122, 123 (1859).
3. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4. Ibid.
5. Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); see Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 997, 124 S.W.2d
675, 677 (1939); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 429, 40 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1942).
